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Abstract—The goal of this paper is to analyze the behavior and 
intent of recent types of privacy-invasive Android adware. There 
are two recent trends in this area: more financial (rather than 
ego) motives, and the development of more dynamic analysis 
tools. This paper starts with a review of Android mobile 
operating system security, and also addresses the pros and cons 
of open source operating system security. Static analysis of 
malware provides high quality results and leads to a good 
understanding as shown in this paper. However, as malware 
grows in number and complexity, there have been recent efforts 
to automate the detection mechanisms and many of the static 
tasks. As Android’s market share is rapidly growing around the 
world, Android security will be a crucial area of research for IT 
security professionals and their academic counterparts. The 
upside of the current situation is that malware is being quickly 
exposed, thanks to open-source software development tools. This 
cooperation  is important in curbing the widespread theft of 
personal information with monetary value.  
Keywords- Security for Mobile Computing; Privacy Protection; 
Security Analysis 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the behavior and intent 
of recent types of privacy-invasive Android adware. This paper 
starts with a review of recent developments in Android mobile 
operating system security. Many tools and applications used 
either to create malware or to clean malware are open-source 
and free. The scope of the analytical part of this paper includes 
different samples of the so-called Plankton malware, other 
similar but recent adware that have followed in Plankton’s 
footsteps, a sample of drive-by malware, and the Tigerbot 
Trojan (to set a contrast). The aspiration of adware perpetrators 
seems to be to spread in the highest numbers possible, just like 
ocean plankton existing in extremely large numbers. The 
financial motives behind their activities are clear. Their 
objective is not to disrupt computer users and companies but to 
make quick financial gains. In looking at adware, this paper 
also addresses ads in general and ad networks. As a result of a 
static analysis of sample mobile threats, this paper also 
addresses the pros and cons of open source operating system 
security, and dynamic analysis tools and projects. This study 
concludes by tying the review and analytical findings to 
practical recommendations. 
II. REVIEW OF MOBILE SECURITY LITERATURE 
So far mobile malware has largely targeted the Android 
operating system as opposed to other systems, for example, 
iOS and Blackberry OS. Some of the recent threats have been 
elevated in the media. Skeptics may attribute this partly to 
computer security software companies wanting to create a new 
market on mobile systems for their products; similar alerts 
were published several years ago regarding the other major 
mobile operating systems even though the long run outcomes 
have not turned out to be grave. One difference this time is that 
the target is a semi-open source operating system. Researchers 
continue to discover new vulnerabilities on Android devices. 
Serious examples include botnet malware involving numerous 
apps downloaded by a great number of users from the Android 
Market. In recent years, many file sharing, peer-to-peer, and 
torrent web sites have been targeted or stopped by government 
authorities and copyright owners’ associations around the 
world. This trend may lead to fewer Android malware and 
adware as some of these web sites distributed Android software 
(containing malware and adware) and operated ad networks. 
A service called Bouncer scans the Android Market 
(Google Play) for known malware and simulates newly added 
apps to catch the misbehaving ones. Bouncer has its 
shortcomings as a dynamic tool because it can be circumvented 
if infected applications are intelligent enough to behave 
normally during the scan and then misbehave in a normal 
environment. Bouncer checks an app only for five minutes, 
using the same the phone account with exactly one phone 
contact and two photos [2]. Although Google has a track record 
of removing reported misbehaving apps, during the course of 
writing this paper, there have been cases observed where some 
apps either remained on or came back to Google Play.  
According to Google, Android included certain core 
security features from the start, including sandboxing (putting 
virtual walls between applications and other software on the 
device) and using a permission system, which shows the user 
during installation what types of access each new app demands. 
Furthermore, Android’s recent version 4.1 provides greater 
user control and security against unwanted notifications 
displayed on the smartphone. Users can click and see exactly 
which apps have generated any of the notifications, and choose 
to turn them off or uninstall the application.  
In addition, behavioral biometric security will play a larger 
role with Android’s recent versions 4 and 4.1 as they come 
with a facial gesture recognition app for security (which is 
enhanced with a blink option so that it cannot be tricked by a 
photograph). Other examples of behavioral security are new 
software products, which understand and verify each unique 
user’s keystroke and user interface patterns. These may protect 
important data, if a device were stolen or compromised.  
The question of whether open source software is more 
secure than proprietary software has been discussed for a long 
time. Although some of this discussion is technical and 
empirical, it is also inevitably influenced by the authors’ own 
background and even stereotypes. Similar to Linux, the 
Android brand has a socially benevolent image as a virtue of 
having open-source code (though the hardware manufacture 
and much of the software development is for profit). This lends 
sympathy in society in general and among computer 
enthusiasts toward the cute little robot (the Android logo). As it 
is costless and easy to access, many organizations and 
consumers have become prone to blindly trusting open-source 
software [14]. On the other hand, open source communities 
have the potential to address problems faster than commercial 
application teams.  
III. STATIC VS DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
There are two ways to analyze malware in general whether 
desktop or mobile: dynamic analysis and static analysis. 
Dynamic analysis involves automated tools to execute the 
malware in a controlled system environment and check for 
malicious patterns. Therefore a large sample of malware can 
studied quickly. On the other hand, dynamic analysis is not yet 
common for mobile devices because of the difficulty of 
replicating the numerous mobile hardware, mobile operating 
systems, and their many different versions.  
An advantage of Android is the ability to install apps 
through different methods, for example, direct installation from 
an app market, downloading and manually installing (Android 
Packages (APK file format), or Java MIDlets (a certain type of 
platform independent mobile apps). However, this sometimes 
means greater potential for malware infection. Mobile malware 
have different ways of spreading as opposed to desktop 
malware, which further makes dynamic analysis more difficult 
[11]. These spreading vectors include SMS/MMS (Short 
Message Service/ Multimedia Messaging Service) messages 
with links, infected applications in official and unofficial 
markets, seemingly normal applications with a malware 
installer hidden within the installation APK file, wireless 
connections and drive-by infection through a compromised 
web site. Obfuscation and encryption are quite common for 
mobile malware, which also require extra steps in the analysis 
[10]. Other sophisticated techniques used for evasion include 
polymorphism (changing variables and files), and 
steganography (hiding information in unexpected places) [13].  
Static analysis, which involves human work to trace and 
study malware, is more common because of the relatively small 
number of mobile malware. Static analysis can provide higher 
quality results and lead to a better understanding. This 
approach has been used in the analytical part of this paper. 
Android applications come as compressed packages (APK).  
Every application package contains standard components. 
Using certain tools, compiled byte code is reverse-engineered 
into human readable format. The first step is to obtain malware 
sample from a repository shared between researchers and 
professionals. The individual pieces of each package can be 
extracted with a zip utility such as 7-Zip. The first component 
to look at is the AndroidManifest.xml file. This initially comes 
in binary xml format, and contains the system permissions to 
be granted to the app. With the EditIX utility, it is possible to 
convert and read this information in clear text. The second and 
biggest component is classes.dex file, which contains the 
program code, and thus the main or initial payload. This file is 
first converted to a Java archive with the Dex2Jar utility. Then 
it is legible with a Java editor such as JD-GUI. The other 
interesting component in each package is the resources.arsc 
file, which may provide further clues to the analyst.  
The payload of Plankton adware consists of executable Java 
byte code that is initiated in the background. After collecting 
information about the infected device, Plankton contacts a 
specific web site and is capable of downloading further 
payload. It also allows commands to be given remotely from 
the contacted site. On a positive note, Plankton is currently 
detectable by mobile security software and by ad network 
detector software. While writing this paper, the actual Java 
code of the sample malware was analyzed. The list of 
commands that could be given was made legible through the 
Java de-compiler. Furthermore, a number of tactics were 
observed. Deprecated and obsolete code was left in the 
program order to obscure the active code. Similarly, 
programming interfaces were named in meaningless ways to 
either divert or confuse anyone who might be reading the code. 
The web address of the contacted remote site is visible in one 
of the files within the package but again the ploy was to put 
this information in a separate and less expected place.  
First samples of Plankton were uncovered in 2011 by North 
Carolina State University researchers [11]. Samples apps 
containing Plankton were available in 2012 on official and 
secondary markets while writing this paper and one such game 
app was installed on a test smartphone. Ads were frequently 
displayed on the infected device (in and outside of the game) 
along with suggestions for other games to download. The 
browser home page was changed, and a shortcut was placed on 
the desktop. The second sample of Plankton involved a game 
with pictures of pretty women, a common social engineering 
exploitation technique. Currently Plankton can be seen as part 
of an aggressive ad network rather than a Trojan.  
The group of Android malware that includes Spy-E and 
SNDAPPS displays unsolicited advertisements, generates 
notifications, gathers user and phone information, and 
communicates with an ad web site. If the variants NickiSpy 
and SMS.Boxer are considered as related, their payload 
includes draining money by sending SMS from the infected 
device to a premium number [15]. In contrast, the new drive-by 
malware is downloaded by surfing a malicious web site instead 
of using apps. It is also different since it does not engage in any 
of the above activities. It may be a reconnaissance tool to reach 
mobile devices (which may be attached to corporate networks) 
and possibly try to use them as a jumping board for an attack.  
One of the newcomers among Android malware in April 
2012 was TigerBot. This malware allows remote access by the 
attacker and can be controlled via SMS messages [18]. It will 
listen for specific messages, which can steal contacts lists and 
screenshots, change network settings, deactivate other 
software, and control running processes. During the static 
analysis in this paper, the apps containing this malware have 
been shown to obtain (if installed) an unusual variety of 
intrusive permissions. TigerBot is beyond adware, actually a 
Trojan going so far as to disguise itself with a Google icon.  
The Honeynet online community has been at the forefront 
in showcasing new dynamic analysis tools for Android 
malware [19]. These tools include DroidBox and 
APKInspector, which have been trialed during the course of 
writing this paper. In some ways, these tools do not completely 
automate all human analysis. Rather, they synergistically 
integrate individual tools into a suite, run them together with 
less effort, and produce visual graphs, and work flows that 
greatly assist the examination of malware. Technically, these 
tools can be used broadly to help analyze any Android 
software. However, there are features that make them 
especially geared toward catching malicious activity, for 
example screen tabs for permissions and phone calls, and 
measuring SMS, cryptographic activity, and data leaks.  
A honeypot is a computer system that can be used as a trap 
and be monitored in order to detect and study new attacks. This 
type of system can help automate security analysis by reducing 
the manual search for malicious apps and servers, and by 
capturing live information and audit logging the attacks. 
HoneyDroid started in 2011 as the first effort to build a 
honeypot system for the Android platform [20]. Although 
honeypot ideas were explored in earlier years with Windows 
Mobile and Symbian, the projects have not matured or stayed 
on as a result of those platforms being phased out or revamped. 
The first challenge is making the Android honeypot visible to 
attackers. Perhaps a main reason that undermines the feasibility 
of a honeypot system is that smartphones rarely run network 
services to be noticed by itself on the internet and an active 
seeking of malicious sites or people would somewhat conflict 
with the idea of a honeypot itself. The second challenge is that 
the core components of the honeypot system must themselves 
not be vulnerable as that would cause them to not function 
properly for detecting and recording malicious behavior. 
HoneyDroid’s solution to this dilemma is to virtually run 
Android on top of another securely isolated microkernel 
operating system, all residing on real phone hardware [20]. The 
drawback of this approach is that virtualization may be noticed 
by malware or it may not run the same way in the honeypot.  
IV. FINANCIAL MOTIVES 
It is not just the core technical attributes of an operating 
system that determines its exposure to risk; the greater 
popularity of any operating system platform will lead to more 
attempts by perpetrators to target that platform and its user 
base. Nevertheless, obscurity does not mean better security; in 
comparison to proprietary operating systems, open-source 
operating systems allow and encourage a greater number of 
people to work against malware. The body of knowledge 
suggests that hackers typically do not go about finding 
vulnerabilities by reading the underlying source code; they do 
so by probing and trying different tactics from the outside [5]. 
As a result, brute force attacks are often used. Mike Calce is a 
famous former hacker, and currently a consultant and the 
author of a book on internet security. In an interview in 2012, 
he also stated his belief that the ulterior motive for most of 
today’s hackers is monetary gain [7]. In addition, the risk is 
shifting more and more from governments and companies to 
individuals.  
Adware is any software package that automatically presents 
advertisements to users by guessing from their previous surfing 
or search activities. This involves collecting information, often 
by user consent, but in some cases, stealing important personal 
information for ulterior harmful motives. Aside from adware 
used intentionally by an ad network, other intrusive adware 
may also exploit an ad network and subvert revenue and 
information from the owners of the ad network [3]. Social 
engineering is the art of manipulating people using trickery or 
deception for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or 
system access. Phishing is a common type of social 
engineering where the attacker notifies users that they need to 
take action. The email or pop-up contains a link to a fake web 
site for collecting the user’s id and password. Adware may also 
be used in combination with phishing or automated click fraud.  
Some of the pushed ads are displayed through the Android 
notification bar. The developers of an app can earn part of the 
advertising revenues this way. This is usually done via cloud 
messaging, where the server can send notifications to a 
smartphone without the device requesting them first [6]. This 
of course requires that the app has gained the necessary 
permissions to auto-start at boot and run in the background. 
This may cause drain of resources such as the battery, 
temporary files and images occupying the device’s storage 
space, and increased internet data usage and roaming charges 
[6]. Furthermore, if the notifications are clicked on, they may 
lead to phishing, hacking, or other high risk web sites. Google 
has updated Google Play Developer Program Policies in 
August 2012 to prohibit inappropriate advertising activities. 
With these policies, aside from generally illegal and offensive 
content, Google is also banning deceptive adware behavior in 
apps such as impersonating the operating system, making 
changes to the user’s device, hiding from the user which app is 
generating the ads, and not giving the user the ability to adjust 
advertising preferences [1].  
The analysis of malware and recommendations against 
them are not based only on program logic because there are 
supplementary geographic and financial trends. Malware and 
adware can be better understood in the context of their 
monetary objectives and countries where they often originate 
and are distributed (in particular China and Russia). For 
example, one of the most recent and sophisticated malware that 
downloads paid apps and media files, leading to unwanted 
monetary charges, is based in China. The malware called 
TROJMMARKETPLAY (discovered by security vendors) 
comes in multiple versions, some of which even includes 
experimental code. It changes the smartphone’s access point 
name, connects automatically to a secondary app store, closes 
normal consent windows, and intercepts verification codes 
messages so that the user remains unaware in the interim [9].  
Secondary (unofficial) app markets, where many malware 
have been found, seem to have grown also as a result of 
language factors in the case of China, Hong Kong, and other 
parts of East Asia. The official Android Market (Google Play) 
is still blocked as a result of government restrictions in China. 
This has given rise to many secondary local app markets there.  
On one hand, many free apps rely on advertising to support 
their development. On the other hand, as can be seen from the 
sample malware, certain apps have crossed the line from 
merely displaying ads to pushing (or forcing) products to the 
user, harvesting private data for future use (e.g. spam or other 
use), and even extracting fraudulent revenues. It is possible for 
hackers to rent premium rate numbers anonymously (for 
generating dialing or SMS fraud) in Russia and other Eastern 
European countries whereas this is not possible in many other 
countries [17]. This type of fraud affecting Russian Android 
users goes back to 2010, involved sending SMS to certain 
numbers that cost the users US$ 5 per message [11]. A recent 
example of the same SMS fraud activity involved fake Skype 
apps that were downloaded through Russian web sites as Java 
MIDlets, which again cause monetary damage [8].  
Recent types of Android malware resemble their desktop-
based predecessors rather than being genuinely created for a 
specific operating system. Therefore it is necessary to recall the 
key motives of the hacker subculture in general that also 
pertain to malicious Android activity. These are entertainment, 
ego, status, entrance to a social group, money, and cause [4]. 
Money, a less common motivator in the 1980s, has grown as a 
result of the World Wide Web, the enormous volume of 
commercial transactions, and the vast amount of personal 
information available and exchanged online [4]. The stolen 
information (credit cards, bank accounts, logins, etc.) is sold 
between hackers worldwide. Malware and botnets (collection 
of compromised computers) are also traded in this underground 
economy. This black market allows skilled hackers to make a 
profit by selling their expertise and spoils to others [4].   
V. CONCLUSION 
Android is presumably the most popular mobile operating 
system in most countries (including high-income countries). 
Android has achieved the market breakthrough that the 
proponents of open-source and Linux software have been 
waiting for, in economically developing countries as well [12]. 
Android has been successfully adopted by many hardware 
manufacturers, with a wide range of expensive and low priced 
models. By 2015, low-end Android smartphones are expected 
by market researchers to seize 80% of the market in Africa, 
India, and China [16]. This great market share across the world 
also makes Android vulnerable as it provides a large financial 
incentive for hackers and malware perpetrators to target its 
individual users and their private information.  
Android security will be a crucial area of research for IT 
security professionals and their academic counterparts. The 
upside of the current situation is that malware is being quickly 
disclosed, thanks to accessible and open-source software 
development tools. Open source software facilitates worldwide 
community response to security threats. Cooperation against 
malware needs to increase, not just within individual countries, 
but across different geographic regions of the world.  
In the future, honeypots and dynamic analysis tool suites 
should put more emphasis on detecting and understanding 
malware behavior that may have monetary consequences.  In 
order for honeypots to become more visible and successful, 
they should be deployed in different parts of the world and be 
capable of operating in different languages. The future holds 
promise for interesting developments in smartphone security.  
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